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FOREWORD
SECURITIES ARBITRATION: A DECADE AFTER
McMAHON"
Norman S. Posert
October 25, 1996
I welcome you to the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on
securities arbitration. With a federal appellate judge, a former
commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
a group of distinguished academic scholars in the areas of
arbitration and securities law participating in today's program,
I am confident that this Symposium will provide a lively and
useful discussion.
I will use my introduction to the Symposium to bring to
the fore a problem that has not been much discussed by courts
or scholars, but which nevertheless threatens to limit the
usefulness of securities arbitration.1 I am referring to the
*©1996 Norman S. Poser. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; LL.B., 1958, Harvard Law School;
AB., 1948, Harvard College.
1 Occasionally, judges have expressed concern about the impact on investors of
arbitration related litigation. For example: "I remain troubled by the practical
effect for respondents-residents of the States of Florida and Virginia-who nor.
have to litigate the brokerage firms' Statute of Limitations defenses in New York
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tendency of parties who have agreed to arbitrate their disputes
to engage in extended court litigation of issues collateral to the
arbitration.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon held that
agreements to arbitrate claims under the federal securities
laws were enforceable.2 At the time, some feared that
investors would be treated unfairly when their claims were
heard before arbitration panels rather than federal courts;
while others believed that the speed and economy of
arbitration would benefit brokers and investors alike.
Arbitration was expected to provide relief from the "rampant
growth of the civil docket in the United States," which Judge
Selya has described as an example of 'hypertrophy" or the
"overgrowth... of an organ or part... resulting from
unusually steady or severe use."3
I do not believe that either the fears or the optimistic
claims that were expressed a decade ago have materialized.
According to the United States General Accounting Office,
there is no evidence of any systematic unfairness to investors
in arbitrations.4 On the other hand, arbitration has lost some
of the speed and economy which are the principal reasons for
its existence. Judge Selya discusses this development in his
contribution to this Symposium issue.5 To some extent, the
tendency of arbitration to become more like litigation-and,
thus, to take on some of the most undesirable features of
litigation-is due to efforts to make arbitration more fair.
What is emerging is a compromise between the competing
goals of investor protection and the efficiency, privacy and
finality of arbitration.6
State court before ever reaching the arbitrators' door." Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., Inc. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 207, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1316, 623
N.Y.S.2d 800, 808 (1995) (Kaye, C.J., concurring).
2 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 1114 (1981)), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
956 (1990).
4 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEcumTiEs ARBITRATION: HOW
INVESTORS FARE 6 (GAO/GGD-92-74) (May 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
' Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound? The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. 1433, 1445-47 (1996).
' Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of
Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 1113 (1993).
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The impact of mandatory arbitration on the legal system,
and on the respective rights of brokerage firms and investors,
has turned out to be more complex than many persons
predicted in 1987. In the McMahon case itself, a brokerage
firm was successful in its attempt to enforce an agreement
with a customer to arbitrate future disputes. Conversely, the
customer was unsuccessful in his attempt to avoid enforcement
of the agreement. In McMahon, as in many of the arbitration
cases during the 1980s, the investor wanted to try his case in
court, while the brokerage firm wanted to arbitrate.
Since 1987, many brokerage firms, including the largest
firms, have required their customers to arbitrate all disputes.!
Most firms' printed customer agreements contain arbitration
clauses, and customers, especially those who wish to open
margin accounts or to trade options, have no practical choice
but to sign. Arbitration is based on agreement, and nobody can
be forced to arbitrate unless he or she has consented to do so.
The courts, however, have shown little sympathy for customers
who sign an arbitration agreement and later claim that they
were induced to sign by fraud' or that the agreement was an
unconscionable contract of adhesion s Professor Speidel's
article discusses the consensual basis of arbitration in the
world that McMahon created.
Anyone who even begins to review the large volume of
judicial decisions concerning arbitration during the past decade
will see that a curious role reversal has taken place. Today,
although brokerage firms continue to include arbitration
clauses in their customer agreements, it is more likely to be
the brokerage firm than the investor who seeks assistance
from the courts to limit the role and authority of arbitrators. I
am thinking of such important issues as whether arbitrators
have the authority to award punitive damages," whether an
GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 28-29.
8 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir.
1988).
' See, e.g., Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 700
(10th Cir. 1989); Driscoll v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 815 F.2d 655,
658-59 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987); Coleman v. Prudential Bache
Se., Inc., 802 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986).
"0 Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither
Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996).
" See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212
1996]
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arbitration is time-barred, 2 and whether the arbitration has
been brought in the proper forum. 3 Unfortunately, there has
been a proliferation of arbitration-related litigation, tending to
defeat the purposes of having arbitration in the first place.
Instead of saving time and money by arbitrating, the parties
may find themselves engaged in two costly proceedings, one
before a court and the other before arbitrators.
Having won the battle for mandatory arbitration, the
securities industry has found that it is a mixed blessing. Marc
Steinberg makes the point in this Symposium issue 4 that
investors today may be better off in an arbitration forum than
they would be in court, given the limitations that Congress and
the courts have placed on private rights of action under the
securities laws. I would add the converse point that brokerage
firms often may be better off in court. If we look at the
arbitration process, we can see why this is so.
There are no express provisions for motion practice in the
securities arbitration rules of the principal arbitration forums:
the National Association of Securities Dealers, New York Stock
Exchange, and American Arbitration Association. Consequent-
ly, claims that a trial judge might dismiss before trial are
likely to be heard by arbitrators.
Arbitrators are not subject to the kinds of restraints that a
trial judge exercises over a jury. There is no judge to instruct
the arbitrators on the law, grant a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or reduce the damages by remittitur. Arbitration
procedures are informal and arbitrators are not required to
follow the rules of evidence. Arbitrations are conducted in
secret, and arbitrators are not required to explain their
decisions. Arbitral awards do not have precedential effect. The
results of arbitrations are therefore less predictable than in
litigation.
Judicial review of arbitral decisions is limited, largely, to
arbitrators' corruption or other misconduct. 5 The Federal
(1995).
12 See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).
13 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d
109 (2d Cir. 1990).
" Marc. I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the
Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996).
1 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
1332 [Vol. 62: 1329
FOREWORD
Arbitration Act does not permit a court to vacate an
arbitrator's decision simply because it is based on a mistake of
fact or law."6 McMahon was based on the precept that
mandatory arbitration should not alter the substantive rights
that the parties would have if they were in litigation. In
theory, only the forum changes, not the substantive law.
However, because of the narrow scope of judicial review, no
mechanism exists to enforce that precept. Thus, unlike trial
judges and juries, arbitrators are virtually unaccountable to
any judicial or other supervisory entity.
Although many plaintiffs' lawyers would still prefer to
bring a case before a jury than before a panel of arbitration, I
believe that the special characteristics of arbitration that I
have mentioned pose special problems for brokerage firms,
which are usually the defendants in disputes with their
customers. The lack of predictability of arbitrations and the
absence of constraints on arbitrators have been factors behind
the efforts of brokerage firms to persuade the courts to limit
both the authority of the arbitrators and the scope of matters
that are arbitrable.
Some litigation in connection with arbitrations is
inevitable, but much of it serves neither the goals of efficient
dispute resolution nor of investor protection. In some
instances, investors have been required to litigate in more than
one federal district, at the trial and appellate levels, before
being able to have their substantive claims heard by
arbitrators. 7 If arbitration is to fulfill its purpose as a useful
alternative dispute resolution mechanism, arbitrators should
be given as much authority as possible to decide the collateral
issues that arise in the course of arbitration proceedings.
Litigation of issues collateral to arbitrations should be
discouraged.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there is a
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, and any doubts
about the scope of an arbitration agreement must be resolved
in favor of arbitration."8 Nevertheless, arbitrators should not
'" Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989).
17 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323
(7th Cir. 1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
18 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); see Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
1996]
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be placed in the position of deciding the scope of their own
jurisdiction. The Federal Arbitration Act requires that a court,
not arbitrators, decide the threshold question of whether a
dispute is arbitrable.' 9 Thus, whether it is for the court or the
arbitrators to decide a particular question depends on whether
that question is characterized as a question of arbitrability.
The broader the definition of arbitrability, the more court
litigation there will be on issues relating to arbitrations.
Earlier this year, in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi,0 the
First Circuit squarely addressed the question of the meaning of
arbitrability, and thus defined the respective roles of the court
and the arbitrators. The court defined arbitrability narrowly. It
held that if the parties have (1) entered into a valid arbitration
agreement and (2) the arbitration agreement covers the subject
matter of the underlying dispute between them, there is a
presumption that the parties have made a commitment to have
an arbitrator decide all the remaining issues necessary to
reach a decision on the merits of the dispute.2'
Under the Elahi rule, issues such as whether an
arbitration is time-barred,22 whether the arbitration is held in
the proper venue,' whether joinder of parties is proper24
-resolution of which has been the source of much court
litigation in recent years-must be decided by arbitrators. If
this salutary decision is followed by other circuits, it will
reduce the problem of excessive arbitration-related litigation.
This result seems consistent with the purposes of the federal
securities laws, investor protection, and those of the Federal
Arbitration Act, efficient resolution of disputes and
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 485 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
19 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S.
Ct. 1920 (1995). In First Options, the Court also held that arbitrability would be
for the arbitrators, not the court, to decide if the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability. Id. at 1923-24.
'0 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
21 Id. at 599.
22 See, e.g., PaineWebber Inc., v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323
(7th Cir. 1995).
24 See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock, 696 F. Supp.
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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